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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






KEITH P. SEQUEIRA, 




SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
____________________________________ 
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Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Agency No. SEC-1:3-l7734r) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 11, 2020 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 







 Keith P. Sequeira, proceeding pro se, petitions for a review of an order issued by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) upholding the Financial 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) decision to indefinitely suspend him from 
associating with any member firm.  FINRA imposed the suspension because Sequeira 
failed to pay an award to Wells Fargo Advisors that was entered by a FINRA arbitration 
panel.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.    
 Sequeira worked for Wells Fargo as a registered broker.  In February 2010, Wells 
Fargo loaned Sequeira over $47,000 pursuant to a “Client Service and Loyalty Award-
Level One Agreement” and a promissory note.  Under the terms of those documents, 
Sequeira was obligated to repay the loan if he was terminated.  Both the Level One 
Agreement and the promissory note contained arbitration clauses stating that “any action 
instituted as a result of any controversy arising out of [the Level One Agreement or the 
note], or … [the] interpretation thereof shall be brought before the arbitration facility of 
[FINRA] to the exclusion of all others.”  Wells Fargo terminated Sequeira’s employment 
in August 2010.  Sequeira failed to repay the loan, and Wells Fargo commenced a 
FINRA arbitration action against him.  A FINRA arbitration panel awarded Wells Fargo 
compensatory damages, plus interest, as well as attorneys’ fees.  In the August 5, 2014, 
letter notifying Sequeira of the decision, FINRA explained that it could suspend his 
registration if he failed to comply with the award.   
 Sequeira did not pay the award.  Instead, he filed in action in the Superior Court of 
New Jersey seeking to vacate the arbitration award.  But because he failed to properly 




without prejudice for lack of prosecution on March 27, 2015.  Thereafter, Sequeira 
unsuccessfully sought to have the case reinstated.1   
Meanwhile, on July 27, 2016, Wells Fargo notified FINRA that Sequeira had not 
complied with the award.  Shortly thereafter, FINRA’s Office of Dispute Resolution told 
Sequeira that, effective August 19, 2016, FINRA would suspend Sequeira from 
associating with any FINRA member firm unless he demonstrated that he had (1) paid the 
award; (2) entered into a settlement agreement concerning the award; (3) timely filed an 
action to vacate or modify the award and that such motion had not been denied; or (4) 
filed for bankruptcy and that the award had not been deemed non-dischargeable.  In 
response, Sequeira argued that he satisfied condition (3) because his action in the 
Superior Court had been denied without prejudice, rather than on the merits.  A FINRA 
hearing officer issued an expedited written decision, rejecting Sequeira’s argument and 
ordering that Sequeira be suspended from associating with any member firms until he 
paid the award in full, settled the matter, or filed a bankruptcy petition.  Sequeira sought 
 
1 In particular, Sequeira moved for an extension of time to file and serve an amended 
complaint, but the Superior Court denied his request.  Later, the Superior Court denied 
Sequeira’s motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for an extension of time, noting 
that the case “remains closed.”  Undeterred, Sequeira attempted to reinstate the action by 
serving his original complaint on Wells Fargo.  On September 30, 2016, the Superior 
Court concluded that Sequeira failed to provide either good cause or exceptional 
circumstances for his failure to prosecute the action, and again stated that the case 
“remains closed.”  The Superior Court’s orders were affirmed.  See Sequeira v. Wells 
Fargo Advisors, LLC, Docket No. A-1995-16T1, 2018 WL 3018882 (N.J. Super. Ct., 




review of that decision by the Commission.  See Securities Exchange Act Section 19(d) 
[15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)].    
The Commission concluded that the specific grounds on which FINRA based 
Sequeira’s suspension existed in fact, that the suspension was in accordance with 
FINRA’s rules, and that FINRA had applied its rules in a manner consistent with the 
Securities Exchange Act.2  See Securities Exchange Act Section 19(f) [15 U.S.C. 78s(f)].  
Accordingly, the Commission dismissed Sequeira’s application for review.  See In re 
Application of Keith Patrick Sequeira for Review of Action Taken by FINRA, Exchange 
Act Release No. 85231, 2019 WL 995508, at *9-10 (SEC Mar. 1, 2019).  Sequeira 
petitions for review of the Commission’s order.   
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of the Commission under Section 
25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).  We review the 
Commission’s decision to uphold sanctions for abuse of discretion and overturn the 
sanction only if “unwarranted in law or … without justification in fact ….”  Butz v. 
Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  An abuse of discretion occurs where (1) a sanction is 
“palpably disproportionate to the violation,” or (2) the Commission “fail[s] to support the 
 
2 In an earlier decision, the Commission had remanded the matter to a hearing officer for 
clarification whether the sanction imposed was disciplinary or non-disciplinary.  The type 
of sanction imposed affects the standard of review applied by the Commission.  
Thereafter, a FINRA hearing officer issued a second expedited decision clarifying that 




sanction chosen with a meaningful statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons 
or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the 
record.”  McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 188 188 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
As noted above, a party who does not comply with an award issued by FINRA 
may avoid suspension by demonstrating, inter alia, that he has filed a timely motion to 
vacate or modify the award and the motion has not been denied.  See FINRA Regulatory 
Notice 10-31, 2010 WL 2712571, at *2 (effective July 2, 2010).  Sequeira contends that 
this defense should have shielded him from suspension because, although the New Jersey 
Superior Court dismissed his action to vacate the award, it did so without prejudice, 
rather than “on the merits.”  Appellant’s Br., 35.  The Commission properly rejected this 
argument.  As the Commission explained, FINRA rules “do not require that a motion to 
vacate an arbitration award be denied on the merits.  Nor do they distinguish requests to 
vacate arbitration awards that are denied ‘with prejudice’ from those that are denied 
‘without prejudice.’”  See Sequeira, 2019 WL 995508, at *5; see also FINRA Manual, 
By-Laws of the Corporation, Art. VI, Sec. 3(b) (stating that FINRA may suspend any 
person who fails to comply with an arbitration award “where a timely motion to vacate or 
modify [an] award … has been denied”).  Moreover, the possibility, however remote, that 
 




Sequeira’s dismissed state court action might be reinstated does not change the fact that 
his attempt to vacate the award had been denied.     
Sequeira’s remaining claims also lack merit.  First, Sequeira argues that FINRA 
lacked jurisdiction to compel him to arbitrate his dispute with Wells Fargo because the 
arbitration clauses did not notify him that he was waiving his right to sue.  The 
Commission correctly rejected this argument because an arbitration award cannot be 
collaterally attacked by a respondent in a FINRA expedited proceeding.  The 
Commission had jurisdiction to review only FINRA’s decision to suspend Sequeira based 
on his failure to pay the award.  Any challenge to the award itself, including a claim that 
the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction, should have been brought “in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”  See FINRA Rule 13904(j); Robert Tretiak, Exchange Act 
Release No. 47534, 56 S.E.C. 209, 2003 WL 1339182, at *5 (SEC Mar. 19, 2003) (“As 
we have stated on numerous occasions, an applicant may not collaterally attack an 
arbitration award … in a disciplinary proceeding for failure to pay that award.”). 
 Second, he asserts that FINRA’s initial decision contained libelous statements.  
The Commission properly concluded that the libel allegations were “outside the scope of 
this proceeding.”  Sequeira, 2019 WL 995508, at *8.  The allegedly libelous statements 
were made in FINRA’s initial decision, rather than in its decision following the 
Commission’s remand.  See note 2, supra.  Thus, those statements were not part of the 




bearing on whether FINRA’s suspension met the applicable standards under Securities 
Exchange Act Section 19(f).   
Finally, Sequeira argues that there is no basis for his suspension because Wells 
Fargo wrote off the value of the arbitration award in its 2018 tax filings.  Sequeira did not 
assert that claim during the agency proceedings.  Therefore, he is barred from raising it 
for the first time here.  See Securities Exchange Act Section 25(c)(1) [15 U.S.C. 
§ 78y(c)(1)] (“No objection to an order or rule of the Commission, for which review is 
sought under this section, may be considered by the court unless it was urged before the 
Commission or there was reasonable ground for failure to do so.”).   
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Sequeira’s arguments lack merit and 
that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Sequeira’s application for 
review.  Accordingly, we will deny Sequeira’s petition for review of the Commission’s 
decision.  Sequeira’s motion to supplement the record is denied. 
